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The Pattern and Significance of
Economic Planning 1n Korea
by
David C. Cole and Young Woo Nam
•
Economic planning 1s a politico-economic process which draws together
the tE>chniques of economic analysis and the forces of concensus-building,
decision-makinK and action-taking that arc the heart of the political process.
The literature on planning is full of admonitions against a one-sided approach
ht-callsl.' ('conomic analysis, no matter how good, has little impact on a country's
dcvclnpml'ut unless it can be transformed into effective policies and actions.
Conversely, strong policies and government efforts based upon bad analysis or
had Judgcm('Ots ahout the future arr likely to be very harmful. Korean experience
attests to thp. interdependence of the political and economic facets of planning.
A series of plann1ng attempts were sidetracked because the political conditions
were inimical to serious consideration, much less adoption and implementation
of the plans. Eventually a plan was pus h e d through to formal acceptance in
1962, hut thf!n (to was subjected to serious criticism as being mainly a political
devi.cc ratllt'C than a technically sound econ\il11ic program. }o'ina11y, when an andl-
ytically competent: plan was supported by an appropriate political environment,
not only were tlw economic decisions of the government and the private sector
Influcncl'd signt ficant ly, bu'~ also the legitimacy of the government was s trength-
elwel and the antagonism toward the government ()f some alienated groups was
mi t I gatl·d.
TIlt' first ,-'Horts at planning in Korea were begun during the Korean War
hy tl1r f~r~i"n assistance agencies that were trying to assess the best patt~rns
ilnd tll,- p<lll'nl l;l t custs or rehabilitating the Kot ';:.1n economy. The main result
J.-
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of this work was a pro~.: ·.1m prepared by Robert R. Nathan Associates for the
1Un'tl·d Nntfon!-:l Kurc'iJn Heconslructlon Agency. This program although technically
I
nell·quale.>, was IWV('r formally ddopted or even recognized by the Korean Govern-
mnnl mainly for political reasons~ Nonetheless, because no other similar plan-
nfng work wa~ undl'rtaken for several years, the Nathan Plan provided the only
OVl·rnlJ. prrspc·ctf.vc! of the Korean economy's possible growth path during thoa
rt!hahi Ilt.tUon pC'riod. 2
EvpntuaJly in 195R a second planning effort was initiated by the newly
c!stahlislwcJ Economic Development Council of the Korean Government. This ""as
to he a S('v~n y~ar plan which would be divided into a three-year and a four-
yC'ilr pha~w. Till' plan for the firs t phase, covering the years 1960-62, was form-
3
ulcltl'c1 in (1),)1) and approved hy the cabinet in January 1960. Three months later
UH' Hlwl' (;OVPl-l1ll1l'nt was overthrown and the plan was set aside.
In tl ... [oj luwing y(,ar, a new five year plan was prepared by the Economic
1)1' VI' lopnJc!nt C;oun.: iI, hut I f suffered the same fate as the three-year plan. 4
'1"11' draft WilS cOlllpJclc'd just prior to the mi.litary coup of May 1961 and was not
IICl"'plllh L.. to tltc' IlC'W government which assumed power after the! COllp. I t did,
IIClWC'VC"', "J~ovi.c1c~ the has is COl' a third planning attempt which ,,,as final i.y ean-ied
thr()II~" Lo ('lIl11pld·ion anel approved in late 1961 as The First Five l,'ar Eeon,,:nic
!'Jan, ]c/h2-66.
1/{olH'rl /~. Nat h:11l '\1jSOC ia tN;, An I~cuno",ic Programme for Karl-'an Rl'cons true tion,
prc'p,lrC'c! fill" tIll' 1I1l1tl'l1 Nations Korean J{econstruction Agency, March 1954.
2'/iIC"-l' ",',IS il '1-.\'('lIl" program workc'd lip by the Korean Government at the! time the
'1;:11 ''.In l.',1111 \"a1'l ""Il'king on its pruf;ram, hut it was mainly a compendiuln of possi.ble
i n\'I'~ Imc'Il1 pro jl'l'l s.
·',rp" I~,III ).('1' t "1'1 ill1l1i II,: Erfllrt~ fur I~conomi.c Development" in .Jos(!ph S. Chung, Ed.,
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'fht' new ml Ii tary government had been critical of the antiplanning biases
of the I~h('(' Government and therefore gave considerable attention and publicity
to ItR Five-Year Plan. It was encouraged in this by the new United States
aid policies which emphasized planning as one of the key self-help measures
I
that w<lllld quaJify a country for a greater share of United States assistance.
Whll~ rvco~nlzing the importance of building political support for a plan, it
alsn r{'aJizl'd tIll' political role of a plan as a statement of a government's
economic, social and political objC'ctives. If anythir.l~' the First Plan was
overly inflllC'llc('d by political considerations and was attacked as economically
over-ambitiolls and infeaSible because it projected such sharp departures from
th<, past without supporting analysis and explanation of why this might occur.
I\s a rNuJlt of this criticism and the poor performance of the economy in 1962,
the first year of the Plan, it was decided in 1963 to revise the growth targets
::lutf investment program downward. This revision was completed in 1964 but was
ncvpr giv('n much consideration, because it had little significance for current
•
polley dec i s i OilS tha~ ..,erc concerned with the more immediate problems of financial
stlild lh:ntloll. In tim£' the revised version of the First Flve-Yl'ar Plan was fl'r-
gUlL-t'n altug('lh('r ht'calls(' tIl(.' overall perfor;nance of the economy from 1963 onward
W/1:-J approaching or cxn'cding the so-call~d "over-ambitious" patterns of the
(ld,: I 1111 I plan.
Tit.· :->I'cOIul F i Vl' Veal" Economic D<.'ve lopmcnt Plan was prepared in 1965 and
I 11h6 .intl \,'<15 arrJ"IIVN! bv tht' I'rcsidp.nt in August 1966. For th~ first. time in
"UrNll\ t'''l'l'l"il'Ill'(' ..1 plan comhf.n,'d an adequat,e technical base, real istic political
dinlt'nsit'I1S in t.l'rms of tIll' national objectives, and the involvement of key int'crest
,:rPllp:: ill tl,,' pn'paratioll and review of the plan. Also patterns and procedures
hael 11('('11 u('\,(·1 (I[ll'<I !loth fnr translating planning guidelines into policies and
ft)r rc.·Vi5i",~ Ihl' plnn tarJ.;(~rs to respond t: chan~tng circumstances without seeming
10 discr,('dH til!' whol(' planning process. These institutional changes did much
IL-_
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to enhancp the economic and political role of planning within Korea. While
it would he wrong to imply that planning in Korea has achieved the degree of
importan,,(! which it has in India or some of the socialist cOJ,1ntries, it has,
as we will Reck to show, come a long way from the anti-planning biases of the
immediate post-Korean War years.
In the (ollowing discussion we will revi~w Korea's experience with planning,
Riving emphasis to the Secorid Plan with which we were both much involved.
3 (COlll il1l1...·«I)
J>all('rns of '·;(.'OJwmic f)('vcIopment: Korea, the Korea Research and Publication,
IIlC~, lQhh. p. '·11.
41,(:(., Iltid. has <lpproprlately laooled the three year plan, 1960-63 and this
fIrst v(·rsit.m uf til(' five y(!ar plan, 1962-66 as the "abortive plans."
..
,-
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Who Uit! tile! Planning'!
'1'h(' ('arly planning work in Korea was done mainly by foreigners -- the
Nathan team and others associated with the United Nations and United States
Assistance progr~ms--bccausc there were very few Korean~ with any experience
I
in this area. Tn the second round of planning activity from 1959 through 1961,
KOrl'ans plaY('d the m~jor role, with only limited help from fO,reign technicians
or advisors. A nllmb~r of Koreans, who had recently completed training programs
abroad, especially in the United States, were drawn into the staff of the
Economic Dcv~lopment Council and the Ministry of Reconstruction where the
planning work was concentrated, and these people were given the main respon-
sihl1Jty (or pr~~lring the three-year plan and the first version of the five
year plan. l~ere was an advisory team from the University of Oregon attached
to the Economic Dcv~lopment Council at this time but, according to its own
summary rC'pc)rt, the team played a very limited role in the preparation of
(. i th(~r of tht.'IW plans. 5
A(t('r tlw OIl Litary coup, tht' Supreme Council for National Reconstruction
\,,111 ch had <lssuml·d all legislativ(',executive and judical powers took an active
l.nt(·rNll: in the planning work. It transformed the Econolnic Development Council
into til(' Economic Plannlng lloard, ct'mbining the planning, budgeting and foreign
ass istance- aclmi n i st(~r lng functions and charged the planning group with revising
the draft ffVI'-YC'ilr PJ~n to conform to some new guidelines laid down by the
SllT'r('m~' (",'une i 1. 6
rlTlll' l.lt·~'~"u All\' isnry (:roup in Korea, A Report on the Univers ity of Oregon
Advls,lr.,. ~Hssi(1n to th,,' Korean Economic Development Council, 1959-1961 (School
of Ihlsinl'ss Administration, Univ. of Oregon, Eugene, 1961). This report contains
a slImnilry llf till' Three-Year Economic Development Plan, issued by the Economic
J)('vl'1nrm"nt Coundl, Jan. 25, 1960.
tJ,\rtllllr I). I,i Lt I,' Inc. "E<:onomic Development Planning in Korea, Report of the
The revised plan was drafted over several months, again mainly by Korean staff
of the E.P.B. The plan was reviewed by various Korean advisory groups during
the last quarter of 1961 and approved by the Supreme Council. An English summary
, 7
was issued in January 1962.
Shortly thereafter the First Plan was subjected to analysis try several
foreign grollps--a learn from the World Bank and one from the consulting firm
of Arthur D, Ljttl~ Inc. which was sponsored by the U. S. government. Both
oC thrs~ appraisals were quite critical. The World Bank objected particularly
to llt~ amhitlous lllrr.ctfJ of the }'lall whereas Arthur P. Little was more critical
of til(' plalllli ng ml'llJodology and the absence of implementation machinery.
A~; a l'NHl1 t of tt.~8e criticisms the Economic Planning Board undertook to
revise lhe I'lan, as already indicated. But the revision was soon overshadowed
hy inflation prohlems and the need to plan short-run stabilization policies
rathrr than lon).~er-run de-velopmcnt programs. Consequ(~ntly the revision of the
First Plan was largely ignored and the link between the longer-run planning or
dl'vl~lopm('nt largets and current policy decisions became very attenuated. l.'his
).~rowill': irn-Ie-vane ... of planning and the criticism of past planning efforts had,
as IIIjJ~ht h(· l'xp('ctc·d. a discouraging impact on those Korean plann('rs who had
pruclll('('d I Ill' ,q nH I'lall and the revis ion. Many of the leading planners Ie ft
the- r.ovcrnmcnt 01- shifted to other positions and a new, younger group assumed
respoll'ilhili.ty for planning.
llllt' l'('COmml'IHJati.on of the 1.ittle report was that another team of foreign
"l"lIlnill~ <ldvisl'nl ht' lIIade <lv'lilabll' to the Korean Government to help with the
Arthur 11. Li t 1I(' neconnaissance Survey," May, 1962.
7 ~~~._~,~:",.!. i nH Fivl--Ycar Ikonornic Plan, Economic Planning Board, Government
-7-
preparation of the next plan, and in 1964 the U. S. Agency for International
Development contracted with Robert Nathan Associates to provide such a team.
In contrast with the earlier Nathan GX"oup, this one was to work with and for
I
the Korean Government--spccifically the li:.~onomic Planning Board--and was to
help them prcpare the Second Five Year Plan. In addition to the Nathan Group
there was an economic and technical advisory team of the German government which
wa~ attached to the EPB, and it assisted with the planning work. Also the United
States AID miss i on took a very active and direct interest in the Korean &overn-
ITlP.nt's plnnnfng from 1965 onward and, in contrast to the normal pattern of rela-
tionships, flllJl~tioned as a planning advisory group. The AID mission and the
Nathan tram hruught a number of experts in various aspects of planning to Korea
in lQfj') and l')f,fi who further contributed to the formulation of the Second Five
RYear Plan. !~inally several teams were brought in to develop programs for par-
tlcular 9C'ctors. Ttwse included an AID supported study of the . power industry
8a .
nnel a Wor ld Bank supported study of transportation. Thus there ·....as much morc
participation of foreigners in the preparation of materials for and the formulation
of the ~pcond Five Year Plan than there had been 1n any of Korea's previous plan-
ning efforts excC'pt the original Nathan Plan which was a purely foreign product.
Tit iR hrulIclf'n Lng of involvement in the planning process was also true for
lhc KlIrNln govcrnm~nt, academic and professional cOl1l1lunities. The various
minfslr h's of lhr (~ovcrnment were not only asked to propose projects for inclu-
sioll in the invcs:.R1cnl program, but their representatives participated in the
de l tht-rat: ions on <.lev€' lopment .j Lrategy and planning methodology. Staff from
tIl(! min isl. dC's It:,<.1 governml.·nL-owncd development banks made up the grQUp
HThcst' rxp\'rts included, in approximate chronological order, Edward S. Shaw,
.Juhn (;. C:Ilt'lC'y, And Hugh 1'. Patrick on the development of financial institutions
Alld JHI 1 i ,: it"s; I rill.' AUl~ Iman on planning models and conceptual approaches to (Cont.)
~:lKorf'fl Elt'I'lric' ':1'., t:orea J~lp.ct:ric l'ow...·r ~ur"cy, 2 Vols., propared in 1965
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or to indllstry cunmfttN':; which were responsible for assessing the existing
strllctllrC' of prodllction, c:;timnting the future patterns of development and
rt!vf.C'wfng the pro.i/'cts propused for their industries. 9 A number of academic
nnd n~l'len['(.:h gT."OllPS m:l(Je studies of topics which were relevant to planning. 10
Fina fly ..I I1l1mbt'r o[ spc'cial interest grl"lUpS and representatives of the public
wc're cnnsuJtctl pl'riodically, over the rllughly 18 months during ,·'ltich the Second
Plan w3S b~in~ I'lcpared, to ohtain their views on national priorities and the
appro:tclws he I ng contl'llIplated by the Government.
This p;llll'rn of hroau(!Ocd partici.pation although it was still criticizl'd
in Somt' quarLcn; as inad,'quate, was nonethe]~ss a great change from the earlier
plnnnipg ventun':'; whidl had been conceived by foreigners, or, if done by Kore.lns,
carrit'<f llUI cillll't" so rapidly or by such a limited gl"OUP that most parts of
tl1l' (:IJV('rnanl'nl:, much less the general public, fe I t far removed from the result-
Ing plein .... nll (\isilll('rf'sl('li in it.
\.,r" turn llP~" tn llll: (~t1cstions of planning ml·thodology Lo S('(~ how the'
1II1'lho+; h;IV.' '·"""\I,.'el from tht.' original Nathan Program of 11):,/. thrlt\lAh the'
$('(:ond Fiv(' YI,aT PI.lll. Tn this r<~vj(,11 we shall be concerned with the amount
anu t< lncl of poliev guidance given to the planners by higher political authoriq',
the t ~'P('S of Jl L1I1'11 ng models or framc'works uSl'd, the cr itt.!ria for selecting
in~'(':';1 :UP11t prj' ;\.'clS llr l:cunomie polil:i~s for inl:lus ion in the plan, and what
"llle'lIIll I }; WI' rt' IInd/, L. I $('l' that th,.: plaus Wf're interna11y C'nns 1. s t ~"nt ,
Ri(':l.:trd A. Musgrave on t:tx and fis("al p<diey; p('g~y
I;. ~1.. sgr.lvl· lin f(lrf'ign trade policy; Edward Hollander and Edgar McVoy
ItIl m;lnp""'('I' 1'1.IJlllill~~; and ,\liln Strout 011 planning models. Most of these
(";1'<'" u: 11I'\'I';ln,d p,lp!'I·:' l'm[,lldy i ng tht, i. r ana] ys is and r(~coll1mcndaLions, which
,lI't' ,Ut'll j Il i h" I, i It I i"gl· ..;phy.
H.l , ., PI1~ll'I" Indlls t l'y Sll rvcy lC.1m
(.1111 'UI.\, I Ill' I II'CII"il1c1Ild (>11nlsl ry of Transportation Korea Transportation Survey,
DI',lft I~t'p"l'r, i'"I'I"I, 1.96(••
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The Nathan Plan
'Ow Nalholl l'rn~rum was prepared for the United Nations Korean Reconstruc-
lion A~cncy Bud \,/U:1 attuJICU tu Lhe policy guidance of that agency more than to
the desires of the Korean Government or the people. Despite efforts by the
Nalhan team to e Hc it guidance amI cooperation from the Koreans, Synghman Rhee
11
never agreed to thl' undertaking and did nothing to encourage support for them.
Thl' ~efle-rAl gu i de I. ines given by the United Nations C:cl1cral Assembly to lINKRA
were to n,stnn' (he prewar consumption levels and to achicvl~ CJ viable self-
J 'I
RllppOr.t Lng ('col1omy.·· These were interpreted to mean that the per capita con-
SlIlIIplioll levels of 1949-50 should be met hy the end of the rC'construction
proj.~ram, tlta t dOml!S tIc savings should he su fficient to finance a level of
l)
No privRl.l' ('111 ('rprise reprcscnlativcs w('re included in tht:'sc industry committees
(a1: "U~ IJl'('n I hI' p,ll ll.'ro ill F.-ance) hecallo;l' it was f~ared by the Government that
tlu.-y woultl fr('(Itll'111.1 y lake advantage of privileged inforlllat ion that they might
ohLaln from the- "l'lilwr:.ttiIJlls of the industry committees.
HJTh('HC {J1c1l1d('(1 I'rof<>5801' Kec <.:hun Ilan'u stuuy of The Pn'uicaUve Ability of the
KOrNJI1 IIlJlllt-Oul pill Tahh's, and till' Kort~L1n Development A1-i S (.'1.: .LeH.ion' s long-term
pro.i"l." I illns i II "1~on';1II ECOnl1m} in 1980 I::."
1L
.Ill(' Won I.t'(', ~, ciL, t.lllrihtue-:~ P["('~ident I~hce's chilly reel'ption tll the
rllct~; lhat Wll'C' waH not COIl;,lllted Oil lhc project hefol"ehanu, and ellsl,') that Robert
Nalhall w:ts .:Js~:w(·i.ltl·d with th(' n(~mllCl"llti(' Pilrty in the United States (p. 1-5).
Short h' ;lfl.cr L1Il' Nathan team arri.ved in Korea in tite Fall of 19S1, the Repub-
liCHll I'lIr( \' WI)1l I Ia.' electiol1s in the UllitE.'d States, and President Rhee,who
rc'pllrh'dl~' it!('l1lifit·d nlOr(' with the ({('publicans lhall the Democrats, apparently
1."11l1C'(Ildc·d fil:1l if WllllJd Ill'( lll'lp t·o elicit. more as::list<Jnc..~I· from till' newadminis-
Intli,'n III 1111' I'.S. it Kll:t'i.I':; ,"('collstruction program was openly has('d on the
I'p, n-.lI.
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fnVl'stlOenl which would mainLain the growth rate of output at least equal to
I.he raL'r of rHlp1l1al lop incH'ase, and tlwt exports would be sufficient to pay
for lhc' Imporl:; 1.11<.1( lhl' ctJlllltry t"cqu /.red.
Tlll'l°e.' we.' n° a l~(l a lHunhcr of crit ieal assumptions underlylng the Nathan
l'll'ros;r,'lm. Thl'IH! included the propositions that South and North Korea would
not hc rl'lInified during the forcs('eahlt.! future, that then> would bc no renewal
of open hosti lilies betwecn the two sides and no major rl~fugee movements into
or out of South J~nrt'a. All of these proved realistic, although the Korean
r:ovC'rnmenl RI lhtH t illle would not accept the idea of nOIl-reunifil~ation even
14fur planning pUI pmH.'IJ. OLher assumptions were that population growth would
nut c'xcred 2 Jlc'c cenl: JlI:r aumllll - whidl ~I'ovcd to be much too low, that external
,Iss/stnnce: would hr suffieil'lll to meet th" l~stiIDal('cl n'construction nl'cds plus
11ll' slIppurt of mi I ita!")' furcew ahovc il :;pccificd "normal" level, and that the
Kon'an (;uvl'rnmenl wlllIlJ ~iVl' wise ilnd uc~d i.cated support to the rec.:ollstruction
pror,r:ll11.
Tltr third ll·llil'ul c1illlc'nsiull of lIa.' Nst'han Progt'am which related to both
till' g,):l}S ;\IId lhr- ..\S~lllll(lt i,nr. was til(! time period within which the goals could
hl' :iclJievC'd, Till' i r I"("p,)rl· c.: Iii illls tltal after "various trial pattl'l'ns were
an:lly~ed, ••• It appears tltnt ,., programme of the sizto' •.• proposed should
takt· I1holll. five: y<",1rS lo aCI'omplish."I'i Despite tllis claim IJf scientific basi~
for II,!, lil1ll' pl'I'I": ill wflil," II ('om;/I'1,clino '-QuId 1)(' compl~tcd and the economy
llIac/c' ~I'lf-Sllprlll·I'lIi',. ,Ill<.' is Illel illccI to bc'lit-vl:.' lhilt it was also a convenient
I ~
:"II·IHII .\,;slIciIJII'::. ~~. £.!..!," pp.l7-tH).
I , I ' I1..2.!..'.' •
'\"'11" \S".','I'II,;;, ,'p. ,~!..r_ .• I'p, 1(,~11.
-I
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rC)rt·r~n llHHI.fllniw(' wl'n' pn'pan'd Lo 1.001< at that timc'. As it turned out the
•combInalfon uf gOill.::, il::JfllllllptLllnH and tillJ(' pc'riou was not a fl'iISihlc cllnfi~\Iration.
Som(' Pill"ts wt'rl' ~l(:hi('v('el within thC' prescribed five years but others Io/erc not and
the economy was far from sl'lf-support by 1958-59. Whether a more realistic com-
bfnation would hav~ been devised if the Kore~n leaders had participated more
ill'tiVl'ly in ::wtling the guidelines [or the Program is ui.fficult to say, but
J t !it.'C'llIS C llwr that till' main lines were heavi Ly inf IUt'lwi..'d hy a desin' to
show how 1IH' oh.il'l'I.ivc·s ur lINKI~A could be' met within a n'm:olwhl l ' timl~ pl.'ri(ld.
T"t! Knn'811s few Lheir part nt'ver felt bound by or co nt rn itt e d to
thl' Nachan Program lll'caus(' ·they had not rarticipatl'Cl in its formulatilm.
The Nathan l'rllgralll was formulated, as their report l:lay9, from the top down and
from tl1l' nottOnl lip, 01" frolll til<' oVI~raJ I or national income approach and from
16
L11l.' projl'cr.: or c(llIInlodity-by-eommodity approach. But for the aggregative
planning it was nect'!;Sllr)' first to dC'vclopC' tlw nuthlOal income :lncI product
an;ollnlh ~Ind llu:!n to projl'l" t changes ill the major ag';L"egatC':; on the bas is of
a "ft~(, J It fur pnlhabh' uevl'le-p11l1'nts rather l ilell1 extrapolation of past trends
or a [ormal Illude I filted lo p:lst timC' 5I;'ri('s. Although not explicitly
staled, the sC'C/lwncl' of tl1l' aggrC'gatl' planning sC'cms to have bl.~l!JI tl.' \"ork
out thl' private' ;mel p\lhlic consllmption levels consistent with the plan tar-
gets (i.C'. lltl~ prl'war Ill'l" capita consumption levels), to then estimatl~ the
invl'slrnl'nl n'qlli 1".'d t., prll<!\ICl' tltill: l(!v('l of output. Imports llf intermediate
clOd l'~tpilal gllllds WI'n' JcrivC'u frnn. L1I'} prudllction and ;.nvestllll'nt ~'stil1lates
anu t1wn l."lllnp;tn'd wi til cXI'"I:lS that Wl're I.'HtinmtNI sl'I';Il'<ttvly tI' <.ll"riv~ at
llll' nt'l't'SS,u'y flll"l'ign assistanc(' inflow. Lt is not ell'ar how m.1ny and what
kinds .If .td jllSll1h'IILs HVl'(' rt'quin'd to arrivC' at an internally c:onslstent program
'lnd ,'nc' \llt i dl h'"" Id O1,1kl' )loss ib 1.(' thl.' tl'rminat ion of <,~.tl'rnaJ. ass is tance by
II.
.'!.I..i_I.I.. 1" hO -I' I •
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tIH.· end of 11tc' plan Iwriod.
Thf' ('rfll'rfn for HI'I('ctfng inv('stment in the Nathan program wcr<, primarily
or','nl,..d lnwanf d",nlllld and import slIlwtflution. As theIr n!port stated, refined
c~alc"lal fOils hllS(·d 011 n.·ll1tiv(' yield~ of all alternativt! investment opportunities
were impractical. Instead by taking account of the resource pattern and the
l"arKet yc!ar rC(ll1i r<,ments fl1r finnl products, and then assuming that there were
(alrly rigid Jimi ts on the attainable volume of exports which could finance
I:lw millimum n('('ded imports, that pattern of investment was developed which would
permIt Koren to " produc(' at home the kinds and quantities of final products it
conStrrnC!9," ,16 [IJl' ;ts thls WllS ecollomically feasible. 17
Milch or the investl,wlIl program in the agriculture, forestry and fisheries
Sf'(~("ors was IUJSNJ 1m proposals contained in a report by a Food and Agriculture
18Oq~anlzatioll team. The jadustrial investment program was a moderately adjusted
version of 11 pro,,!":lm uev('loped by the Korean Government's Office of Planning. l9
Investmenl in infrastructllr~ was geared mainly to meeting the estimated demands
from the ulhl' t· S~l' tors. These several programs were then checked for internal
consi5tl.'IH:V IJnd I rimmc'd to Cit within the prospectively availahle resources.
Wh i It' L1l(' N:H.han rt:oport: rt!peatedly emphasized the need for such internal and
overall cons ~s lPIWV, And thej r various tauulation& of supply and demand were
appropriately h:.lJ.sllced, it is not clear from the report how these balances were
IH','Il,H' <11111 :\~:rj"lIlllll'\' flrg8l1ization, United Nations Korean H('conslruction
1\1:l'l1l'\', 1\,·,,:,1111 i l:1! iOIl <Iud ;)\'v('lopm('nl of Agriculture, forestry ~nd Fisheries in
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'wh','v"" "I' wlll"" 'hI' "III1!li""'III'y Willi 11111111 fIUllj"I'. LII HLn'HH. O"'y hy JO(lkin.~
lit. f10ll'" "f 1111' 1:lrp,,,L!1 :Illd "ll' 11(:(-,,11' d"V(·JoplIIl·lltll of thc' I'c.'unomy f.s It (lClSHihJ('
l:n p,Bfll 'nslgh' illln prohahJC' cOInl'rornfs(·B. This ",ill b(' discussed after revi~w-
lm~ the me!th(l(ls of (firm" JOlt Lng the subsC'C!uent plans.
The' Ahort jV(_~ Plans
Th(' metlwdology of the three year plan formulated by the neh' Economic
O('velopment Council in IlJ59, and of the first version of the fivc year plan
compll-ted in thc' Spring of ) ')61 is not very we 11 documented. Both L\f these
plans Wl'rc' pn', '.,rI'J hastily and by .:l relatively small group ,oIith 1ittle pub-
Ucf.ty nr pf[ort to gain broadened participation. It is doubtful that the
thnlc-ycar plan reel' i v(·d much pos Hi.ve pol icy guidance from the President
COllsid(!rlng his pn~vious anti-planning biases _ The main rc.'ason given for
formulating til«' plan was that "thll recent trend in reductions in for~isn
nid rC'qllirl's it rt'appralsal of ••. economic policies and emphasizes the
11I.'c·d for l(lng-ranJ~l' planning. ,,20 Th(~ <lim _~ the plan was "tll achieve economic
SI" 1'-$\1 [fic h'ney as l"apidly as puss ibh.. through efficient us(' of domestic
h"mall and phys i l~;' I n'SoUl"CNi in conjunction \dth foreign economic aid. ,,21
'I'h(!sc' pl"UpnS it iom; S\lggl~S t that the plan was influenced very much by foreign
ai.d cunsidl'rHllons amI perhaps dit"cctcd as much at justifying continuation
Uf aiel inflows :w with programming investment.
Al"l:onlillg LII 1.1'1', tIl«! thrt·(, y,-ar plan used a Gcrhul"d Golm-typl' planning
nHltlt'l I"ith lhl' Lt'v,-I "f ,'mprOyml'nt .1ml labor productivity as the strategic
22
Vilriahlt·s '''1" c1t·tl'nlli.ning p•. III'utial growth of output. Increased emph'~cnt
.! .l j.: .... ,\J". '::, i \oW Pt'v"I"l'nll'nl CIlIlIH iI, ThrPl'-Yl·ar Economic Dllvc')opmcnt Plan, Outline
:~.). !IJhO, in Univ. l\f Ort'gon, A RC'port on the Univ. of Ol'l'!gon Advisory
~Iiss i"11 L,' 11\1' I\"r":\11 r.I',m,'llli.I' I>l'v('lopmc'Ol Council, l1J59-61.
lJ
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was one of the main targets along with increased productivity and improvement
of the trade balance.
The main lines of policy and the investment program were formulated by
six consultative committees consisting of academics and private technicians
who reviewed til(! proposals of the technical staff of the Economic De',elopment
Gouncil. There w('re no clear criteria for selecting investment projects, &nd
lnformati on on proposed projects was, often inadequate. Consequently the
drci.!ifons on tilt., investment program were based mainly on the judgement of the
consulting commitlt.,cs. The results "f this work were set aside with the fall
of the IHlce government.
At the time work was startcu on the Five Year Plan in the summer of 1960,
the new gov~rnment felt called upon to respond to a different set of pressures
than those wll i.ch had confronLed the deposed Rhee governme:nt. Severe unemploy-
rncnt and s t1ltlcnl demands for incrcasl,d employment opportunities prompted the
J)('mocratf<.~ Party to try to formulate policies and programs which could meet
f"lII'S(' prNlslIre's, Accordingly the Party leadership prepared a set of instructions
fOr" Lilt' gcullomi.c /)('v<.'lorment COtlncil to gUide their werk on the new Plan. These
fnstruction:; S<.'I: lhe :>l:l"atl'gy of the Plan to concentrate on certain key types
of in fras l rllctu n' t or ov('rhcad capital and to use labor-intensive methods of
conSt.rucl iun in su far as possible.
";XCl'pt (or (hi:. new t.~lQrnl!l1t of policy gUidance the planning procedure was
s i In i III r (" tha l (J r l'he Thr('e Year Plan. On a technical level there was a shift
[rom thl' ':(' 10l-ly!'t.! mode I t" a Harrod-Domar type model, and some concentration
uf ('111.' I'l',)jl'cl pro~ratn ,," s('lt'ctcd areas or key industries, in what was then
(,OilS i (!...'r,'d t " r"I"-('scnl an "unbalanced growth st.rategy." nut the main innovation
WaN tlh,' nlOl~l'pl ()f a National Construction Service which would employ the
recent 1:,. ~radlla ll'U s IlItlt'lll..;. and the unemployed common laborers and farmers in
lalhH"- i III ('(1:- i V(' t:,1I11-> l rllcl it n of roads, dams, irrigation works and other key projects.
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TIll' (o'il'Sl I,'ivl'-Ycar Plan
Soon after the military coup in Nay, 1961, the Supereme Council for National
Reconstruction made clear its intention to manage the national economy in acc",r-
dance with a Cully articulated, comprehensive plan. It designated a Korean
advisory grrnlp for economic planning and charged them with responsibility for
22a
formlliati.n~ the I-;lIidelines of a new five year plan. The members of the group
were drawn from academic circles, the Bank of Korea, the Korean Reconstruction
Bank and other gov(~rnment agencies. Within two months the guidelines were form-
Illated, approved hy the Supr~me Council and sent to the Ministry of Reconstruc-
Uon, which shortly thereafter absorbed the budget bureau from the Ninistry of
~'lnal1ce and was transformed into the powerful Economic Planning Board headed
hy the I)(!puty Prime Hinister.
'I'll(' guidelines made use of the work on the Five Year Plan done by the previous
government, but tl\(! ad"isory group did not limit itself to setting out the main
lim's of stratc~~y, Instead it spelled out in considerable detail the overall
and l'JC'clnrn! ~r()wth targets, the components of expenditure on GNP, the targets
fur IncolnC' disi:rihution and the halance of payments. These numerous targets
a.,d proj(~cl ions w('re set without mueh consideration of alternatives or their
interna 1 COilS (.stelley because of the limited time or te'.:hnical apparatus for
doin$<; so.
'flip. main rN.ponsibilities of the planning staff in the r;l'B were to. fill
in th..• details wi thin the guiucl ines that they had been given. This involved
d'l'9 i~~nlJt in~ ~pl.·d fic projl:cts and scheduling them to fit the ot\nnual investment
h·vt.' is. For lhis purpose:. st!ctoral and industrial capital-output ratios were
eSlimlJl~d from I,ast series and applied to the specified output targets to determine
iIlVl~slml'nl' H've Is. There were no particular effie iency criteria for selecting
IlmUlU: 8) t ernal"i Vl' investment projects so the plannf!rs were guided mainly by
J2i\ :;lIp""IIIl' Cf'JlIlld) [01." t\·ll il1nal Reconstruction, Overall Economic I~econstruction
~ (f)rll fl) F,"orn 11102 to ~ 11(,6 Appendix. Korcs 1961.
Il._
..
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thOBP. industries whlch were classified as strategic or key industrie~ by the
Supreme t';ollncil. '['hesc lncilldecl coal mining~ an integrated steel mill~ cement"
petroleum rCl fln ins.; t [t'rt 11 i?cr and transportation. To the extent that these
key projects di d not absorb the total projected investment resource~~ :;.r.her
projects were added in either from those proposed for the earlier Five Year Plan
or on the hasis of new proposals from the Ministries.
The planners then went on to sp~~ify in considerable detail whether individual
pro.lects were to he carried out by the Government or the private sector and what
would he the sources of financing. Thil' practice latt:r created serious problems
hecause private entrepreneurs tended to assume that they would automatically
receive financing if they were authorized Lo carry out a project listed in the
]t lan.
There was no good basis for checking the consistency of th~ Plan in eith'ar
macro or m( cro t.t!rms. As a consequenc~t there were some seriously imbalanced
elements, especially between savings and investment at the macro level as we
sha 11 i ltd icatc later. Also there was only limited coordination and cooperation
amD~'); the vnrillm: parts of the Government in preparing the investment program.
ERsentially til(' phnners had done their scheduling job for the Supreme Council
.1nd tlwy had nol hui 1t any bridges to other Government agencies which would
hav(' facllitat ..d implementation.
to/Hllin .1 y~.'ar lhe First ]:ivc Year Plan was sent back to the planners for
slIhstl1nlial r('!vision. They were given some overall guidance on lower growth
larg('ls ami rm:lour") availabilities, but in the confusion of rapid inflation~
poor a~~riclllll1ral yicldslnd the political pressures of an election campaign,
it proved impossible to devise a generally acceptable set of principleg for
!it'a! ill)~ down Ilw i nvestm('nt proE;ram. ".'hu!; the revision of the First Five Year
1']l1n WIlS finRII\' <I0Jll' in a l'Oll~h and arbitrary manner~ after which it was larg~1y
i ~IHII'I'd hlll'mlSt' III(' Plan provis ions were not considered binding on or even relevant
for curreJlt dl'ci~ion making.
It
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'l'h(' Sl!c'ond Fivc' V(!Ilr l']al1
PrCpl1rllt lOll of the Second Plan extended ovnr a :longer period and was more
23
t horotl~h lind Opt'lt lhan it had hr.en for any of t;he previous plans. Consider-
ation of alternative planning models was begun in the Fall of 1964, nearly two
years he fore tile Plan was finally completed. While this may not seem very fore-
sighted in comparison ',lith the planning work in some countries, it was remarkably
so In K,lrt~an terms. In the Spring of 1965 some basic guidelines for the plan
were prepared hy the Economic Planning Bureau, approved by the Cabinet and cir-
culated throughout the Government. These guidelines did not contain quantitative
targets f or the Plan but indicated the preliminary thinking on plan goals,
strategy and priority investment areas, and called, for the various ministries
Lo suhmit project proposals consistent with tha guidelines. These proposals
were rc!ceived in the summer of 1965 and started through a long and probably not
loo c:.'ffectivl' process of checking the project data and trying to calculate some
cumpRrlH i ve nat-luSlIn's of rates of return for evaluating the projects.
Guncurrcmlly, work was ~oingilhead on the overall planning models. In
Marcil elf ]l)66 Adelman proposed a macroeconomic two-gap model based on the
National income and product accounts. Estimates of the relationships were
prt!pared using the then-available national accounts. The main results of these
efforls were to demonstrate that the existing accounts apparently not only con-
tai.wd Some St'riuus distorl'ions, but that they did not adequately reflect the
st.ructllral challgN' which were occurring in the economy as a result of devaluation,
l'xport cxpans i,on ,1ml rt,'1axalion of impor~ controls. Even if the previous rela-
I iOIl:. l'olllci lit' :ll"'lIralcly ",stimated they w(l'Jld not give a good basis for projecting
fHl1ln' puss ih iIi til'S. II: was decided therefore to postpone further work on the macro
'.! 'J, ~ . .. •
111I'n' IS 11 hl·I .. 1 Sl't:l HlIl on Pn'parat10n of the Plan in the Appendix to the
Sl""'_lIld ,,'iv,' \'l'al' E,',llhlmic: :Il'velopment Plan 1967-71, Gov't of the Republic of Korea,
.Il1lv ."hh,
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rnllde' lint II thl' lIut lonnl nccuunts could he revised and a series prepared in
constant 1965 prices.
Sume very rough macro pro j ec ti 0 11 S were devised w h i 1 e
waltin~ for the revised national accounts, but these were used only to
illustrate Some of the broad strategy choices among alternative export, import,
Huvlngli. invt,gtmt'llt ,1ml forei.gn assistance levels. Eventually when the revised
:ll:collnts we're' cflrnp II' tN'. in pre-Ifminary form in the Spring of 1966, tncy appl~arcd
to hI' mort' rl' liah II' fur reCl'nt years than for th.e 1950' s. This meant thL1t they
wr'rl' suitahle for n'flt'ctJ.nn base- year levels and structure of output und
incomc', but thut they still were not reliable for fitting econ"mctric rc1.ations
in lim!' sr.rir.s form. Thus it was necessary even in the final formulation of
thr.' SPl:nnd Plan. to estimate most of the macroeconomic targets on a larE;ely
l.ntHI livc' busis. givir,1 heavy wctght to the structural shifte. which were then
nCClIrr InJ.t. rlltllC'r than to Us(~ a formal model based on longer run trends ar:c.
r(' lat' Cl/l~ ,
UrcClusc' of thc' uc Hcie-Jlc ies in the time series data and, on tht' other
hand, the: availah i' tty of a recent and apparently reasonably accurate inter-
industry or input-uutput tublt', thl.! focus of formal model building shifted to
till' 'attl'r arNl. lI('n' again Ade 1m a n in October 1965 proposed a dynamic
intl!rindustry prujection modr.l for est.imating sectoral .investment and import
rl'cillirc'ments and t(!sting the consistency of the overall development program.
Th's m'ldpl \....IS c\lOstructcd or implemented on a crash basis within six months
Clnd I'r,'vidt'd tlw uni fying clement i.n the planning process. It gave a con-
("\'l'tll.11 f r.unt'WlIrk f,n' gatherin~ data and cs timates on various types of demand
,lnd S,IUrl'"S Ilf slIpply. It w.1S particularly well suited to assessing some of'
thl' imp! it."r1t{uns Ilf ll)tl'rnativc patterns of manufacturing production.
1',1' i c'Y nil id;lJ1t~1' fur til(' Second Plan was given initially in the Basic
,;.. i "t'{jlll'S ,,,Ilkh \"1'1"1' .1pprll'll't1 by the Cabinet and the President. But these
~19~
broad b'rml'l of rc'fl're'nc(! Wf'rC' trllns]ated into morc specific and ope'rational
gtl:f dunct' Jn II l'U'rIHtp!l uni (flU' ["rum which was finally labeled "Th" Second Plan
24IJp.Jfbrrut(on .JoJnt Mretinp,.11 ThIs group, which was (.~haired by the Vice
Mlnlstt·r of tlw J~conomic PIClnning Uoard, brought together senior officials
(rum the conccrnvd Ministries of the Government, members of the Economic and
Scientific Council, representatives of the Government Party (the DRP) and,
the' unusual feature, rcpresentative~ of the United States Aid'Mission, and the
Nathan and German groups advising the Economic Planniug Board. The joint
-
Il1c,·tin~s wc're held 31 times· in the final year of work on th~ plan to "discuss
"25
':intl rt'vi(!w formulation of the plan. Generally presentations were made by
thl~ st.'lff uf till! Economic Planning Bureau and after hearing the conunents of
llll' variolls part icipants, decisions were made hy the Vice Minister of the EPB
or r('(nrrc·d tn hiJ.;hel~ authority for resolution when this was necessary. Although
(;JII' ml'('tinl~s we'rc' nul. npen to the public, the substance of the presentations
and lh,' dl'('fslons wall frequently made available to the press so that the public
wm. Lnfol"lIIC'd ahuul tlw progt-('ss on plan formulation and the directions the plan
ww, Ilke'ly to pruposl'.
The'r,' was also a Sccl:>nd Plan Consultative Council, which consisted only
{tf Koreans and included rep~esentatives of banks, economic research institutions,
aCcltlt'mics and journalists as well as the vice ministers of the concerned minis-
l"rf,':>. This (;uundJ was mainly a forum fo r disseminating information about
tile' Pl<ll1 hilt m('IllIH'rs ,"c'n' occasionally consulted on some key issues.
lnVt'stm"nt dl'l'tsions in thl' Second Plan were largely dominated by demand
2.'.
TIll' S"l'llIlCl "'LV," ",'oar '~"(ln()mic D~vclupm('nt Plan, p. 180.
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r)rnad l'c'rmH of rc,r"r<'nc(! w,.rc· translated into more specific and opr-rational
guidanc(' In a p"rh:lpR 1Jniqtu· forum whIch was finally labeled "111r Second Plan
24l)eUbrrntlun .Iolnt Mrcting." This group, which was chaired by the' Vice
HInlst(·r of til(' ";conomic Planning Hoard, brought together senior officials
from the cunccrnC'u Ministries of the Government, members of the Economic and
Scicntific COline il, rrpresentativcs of the Government Party (the DRP) and,
tl11' unnsua 1 fNlture', r('prcscntative~ of the United States Aid Missi4,n, and the
Nathnn and German groups advising the Economic Planning Board. The joint
m(!ctings Wl're h('!t] 31 timeS in the final year of work on the plan to "discuss
"25
and T('vil'w formulation of thE:' plan. Generally presentations were made by
th(~ staff of the Economic Planning Bureau and after hearing the comments of
tlw various part icipants, decisions were made by the Vice Minister of the EPB
ur r('(c!rrc,d to higlwr oll/thorlty for resolution when thiS was necessary. Although
tlU' ml'('tin,~s WI'rl' nul Upl!n to the public, the substance of the presentations
and lhl' dl!l'tsions was fr(!qucntly made available to the press so that the public
WllS lnforllU'd abuut the progress on plnn formulation and the directions the plan
Wus Uk(' ly to propnsc·.
'l'hC'rc was also a Second Plan Consultative Council, which consisted only
of Korcan~ and included representatives of banks, economic research institutions,
acnd('mi cs and journalis ts as we 11 as the vice ministers of the concerned minis-
r-rlf·:;. This GOllnd.J was mainly a forum fo r disseminating information about
till' PJ,ll1 hut mC'lJIbl'rS wc're' u('casionally consulted on some key issues.
rnvc'~tmc'nt dr-cision.,;; in the Second Plan were largely dominated by demand
24
T",' S"I"'lllJ ..' iVi' V,'oar IkonCllTlic Dr.ve lopmC'nt Plan, p. 180.
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l'ons Id.-rat luns. TIll'rc' wn~ an attempt to ul>ply internal rate of return cal-
culations to the agricultural investment projects proposed by the Ministry
of Agricultural and Forestry, but this did not prove successful. There was
not adequate information on specific projects so typical land reclamation
or 'rrl~ation projects were analysed, with the expectation that these would
J:'Vf' fl basis for sl'tting priorities in allocating blocks of investment funds
to till' various typNi of pruj(·cts. But the rate of return estimates were not
sufricie'ntly r.·liahlt! to be convi.ncing and continuing disagreement over the
r<']ill ivl' ('mphas is on upland or tideland reclamation projects was not resolved
hy tlH' timl' th.· Plan wns completed. As a consequence the agriculture investment
progr:tm WilS elu i lc' IInspC'(:ific und the absence of a clear statement of strategy
for agr iClllturl'. fort:stry and fisheries made that the weakest part of the Plan.
InvPfHm('nt in milnufa('turin~ was heavily influenced by estimates of the
pole'lll ia I c!C'milrul for (')(ports and the derived demund fo~ intermediate goods to
SlIppJ y thl' ('xport indus tr ies. There were only a few projects involving a
Hil~l1lfic:lnt illl"rl'as«, ill Lmport substitution--an integrated iron and steel
lIli I I" :.l J1(·tl"oc!wlIllcal compl(!x, an aluminum reduction smclter--and these were
[e'ntat Lv(' Ly i Ill'orpornt('d in the Plan without any careful comparative assessment
II" 'u'oc'fi t to the l'C(IOomy. The infrastructure investment programs were demand
orj('ntpd and tIll' allocation; for social overhead including housing, education
,1m) otl1l'r J.:l'V('l·nmlmt s<'rviccs were quite a',:bitrary dec:f.sions based on a combined
:18SPSlimL'nt o[ ell'mand, ('xis ting de ficiencics and available resourcl:'s.
In llw arp.l or policies, till' Second Plan did not propose any major new
eli n'('lions hilt mainly rl'itl'ratt'd the reorientation of policy which had been
l'ilt'r i I,d lllll in till' prl'l'('L'c1ing twu years .:tnd whose effects were becoming signif-
it',tnl ill till' tim,' Uw Plan was b"ing prepare'd. Because the effects were gen-
,·r.lllv in til<' lh'sirl'd :1I1I.J ('xp\!ctcd directions but, on the other hand, because
..
-21-
It waH Atill premature in most ereas to determine whether the prospective
response was of the desired order of magnitude, there was not yet a sufficient
hasis for modify lng most of the policies at that time.
Tlw overall consistency and feasibility of the Secon d Plan was tested
1n rart by tIl(' interindustry model which was most relevant for assessing the
level and comrosition of industrial investment and imports given the estimates
of the growth of final demand. But the main questions of feasibility c.entered
around lIte' increases in savings--especially domestic savings--and ill exports
that wrre rrojected in the Plan. These were areas in which exceptionally
rapId increases had been experienced but for relatively bricf periods. The
Plan assumed that these high rates of increase would continue, whereas the skeptics
believed the Plan was too ambitious. This was the normal disagreement among those
in the midst of a changing situation who cannot be certain whether the change is
merely an oscUlati.on or a real structural break. With the benefit of several
more yc·ars duri.ng wlli cll the high export and savings growth have persisted, it
now se('mS IIInn' c('rtai n tllat a structural change has taken place, but in 1966
(.r was a df.ffil'"ll judgement to make.
...J
-2;1-
As W. Arthur Lewis has suggested, there is no single unifying -=heme
to a discuSRion of development strategies but instead s judgement as to which
I . iii . 26 Th' f hI hssues are tmporta.,.,t n a part cu ar settl.ng. e 1ssues 0 strategy w c
have heen of most CO'lcern in Korean planning since the end of the Korean War
appear to have heen:
a) the overdll rate of growth
h) the structure of industrial production and foreign trade
<..) the divhion between domestic and foreign savings and between various
forms of <!olllestie saving.
d) the structure of markets and the exte\lt of Governmentls role in making
or WI Id InJ; i nves tmen l dec is ions.
TRrge I C:r"owth f{;) les
AI though there are in alY ~iven setting practical upper limits on the
p~tenti31 rale of growth, there is also a range over which the rate ca~ be
expecled LO vary dl'p~ncling upon the cOmmitment of the pO~hJlous to achieving
high J;ro"'lh. the erfectiveness of the economic policies of govern:nent a:ld
the Ilf1controll.ahLe influences of wather, international politics and similar
factors. In selec ting the taq;et growth rates for pla'lningourposes, the
planners or pot icy makers are likely to be ~03t influenced both by what th~y
think is areasoasble up[ler lilllit a,d the degree of commitment to browth which
they ei ther p.:!rl~'-' lve 0 .." ca't hope to inatill in the populous Conceptions of
a r('s'lo'llJhle t IlIIi t are influenced in turn bi' recent performa'lce at least during
Wll;) I. ;Ire <:OIlS ldl'r~d lO b,-, faITorable periods.
I" l"~ KO..-(·.10 1,1.'lllS lh,-,n~ has been a"1 alternatinA pattern of projectin~
"olllillllntlollO: pno;l. gro·"'th raLes WIW.l those have bee.l relatively high or of
-_.-----------------------
---------
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projecLJnp, sharp increa;oes in the growth rate Io1hen the immediately previoas
record has he.:an unfavorable. The Nathan Program, coming right after the l{o4'ea':l
War In which so :nuch of the industrial capacity a':ld infrastructure had
been destvoyed, proposed a very rapid but decelerating recovery with an implicit
compound growth rate of R.6 per cent per a,nu!'I1. Given the limited infor-
mation on previo~s performance of the eco"omy and the fact that this was a
reconstructio~ program concerned with rebuilding along previously established
lines, which was believed to be easier than charting new paths of develo?ment,
the hir,h gro:.tth ta:-get cUd not at that time seem unreaso~lable althoagh it in
far:t proved to !le far above actual achievement. In the subsequent Three Year
PI:r, the target I~rowth rate WIlS set at 5.2 per cent which was about eq'.Jal to
the 1l'"erRge growth rate of the preceedi.1S five years. Then the First Five
Year Plan, prepared in the- midst of the stagnation lleriod, cO:ltained a target
~rowth rate of 6 per cent in its firstversio:l a:ld 7.1 per cent in the final
versto., issued by the military gOiTernmcnt in Ja:luary 1962. This Io1l:19 roughly
double the growth rate of the preceeding three years s:ld was l1luch abo'"e the
levels that the K,,'l4'ean economy had been able previously to sustain fo4' more
than one or two jca:-s Thus it had to imply either major changes in !,oUcies.
cOrnlnltment antl perforl1lance or it simply represented wishful thinklng. The
Government clearly intended the former but was accused by its critics of the
.1ntt~r Poor pl?rfOrm31lce durinri the first year of the PIa., caused the Gov-
ernment to prepace aceviserl First Five Year Plan with a 5 per cent growth
tAr't(?l but, as ~re"io.l~ly I,oted. this WI1:; subsequently set aside \"Ihen the
n'at izt>11 growlh r.lle fro.:' 1963 Il(\ pus!led up a"ove the original 7 J,er cent tar-
get.
Aftl?c (?xperie~cing sev.:aral y~aLs of very high growth, the 7 per cent
growLh tar~el o[ the Seco:,d Five Year Plall seemed reIa~ively modest. Some
"r the cr'lcly formlllatio:l:-; of the pIa' frame had assumed that 1966 would :'e
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" ."nrt nl" ",I'-'1d ~cnr" In w',lt.:11 the f!COI\Omy woulcJ 10t prO,.~rCS9. But as the
I
PLo,t W;J~ h~lI1J~ (lilt Into flnal form, it became increaslns~ly clear that the
economy wa." ,-·'CpaJ1t1i.n~ very rapidly in 1~l66. This resulted i.'l some u!'ward
revls{oll of the output estimates for the whole pla't period and in acceptance
of 7 per cent ar; a mini.m.lm growth target. In subsequent a~nual phnning ex-
ercises the t.arget has b?en raised to 10 l'c'!r cent,27 which is only slightly
above the average growth rate for the four years 1963-66. This move to a
'Iery hi.gh pIa'tning tar~et was prompted i.l large part by experiencing the
severe CO.1S tra ill t~ of bot tlenecks in key infras truc ture area5 such as power
and lralsp~rtalion w11ere it is no~ possible to fill the ~hortages with imports.
'I'll(' plannerR (:OIlC'lllc!ed it W<1S necessary to assume the highest possible growth
rate.:; in plal\llill~ for these sectors if they w'~re not to Ii,nit the growth
0; t.he wl,oie eco,lomy
As ~he various :l13ns have been ,!rdfted and revised over the past 15 years.
8U! the growth largels ha'"e been movecl a'Jout in the range fro:n 5 to 10 pel' cent,
there h:J,~ been I ittJe dislli.;reement over the desirea':lility of striving for
the :. iglre8l: pra·:; Ucahle rates of growth. The arguments have been mninly over
w!l.ll wa:; realistlc, with the implied concern that too high targets would reault
in over illves tOlen l in some area.; an,l the release of infla t1o:lary forces, The
planners :,avl' generally tended to advocate the higher growth targets w'tile
those cO,H:'l'rlH..'tI wi th financial policy ha'"e urged more cautiOtl.
The other tI irectio'\ ill which growth targets ha'/e had relevance is in terms
0;' KOCt.'als reJra':ioll!-l wi.th the suppliers of foreign a,nista':1ce The Nafhan Plan
W~'; ~';(pJidt1y Inll'i1tlcd to ~o~\tri.bute to a~reement amOt1g the ai'" .iOllO'CS on
tlw Jv(:r.lIl n·,:o.l:-l(t'llctio:\ objectives an,l related at;sistance needs It failed
lO ..H.' rv£> "11 is P1l1'l,o•.;e bccr.ll.l:';~ the Korean Governmell t never accep ted the Plan 0;:'
-25-
:t)~rcl'cJ to LtH gl'ller.1I dLrectio!ls. The high, 7.1 percent, growth target of
the FIrst "(I'Lve Year Plem nnd the related level of Investmel\t were judged by
the Wo'd d Bank to exceed by far the poten tial of' the eco:lomy, and in need QI
28bei::lg ~cnled !IO\In. The Arthur D. Little team, doing an evaluatiotl Oll
heh:t1 r of: the· United St.'ltes Government, while acknowledging that the growth
lnrget seemed very high, went on to :3.-.lY that there W31; not sufficient infor-
m:ttion Oil the Kor~a, economy to estimate a practicable rate of growth. They
recommended cOllcentrilting 0,\ the preparation and analys is of investment
projects :tnd largely eli~inating the macroeconomic planning dimensions. As
II result of these reports and other assessmentH, neither the United States
nor the World Bank accepted the Plan as a basis for determining appropriate
levels or com~osition of their 3ssistance. 29
More recently the Wol"ld Bank has formed a Consultative Group on assistance
to I(orcn .1nd ~,:t;.; been evalu.1 ting KOl'en I s growth recol'd and targe ts as a
basis for determining assistance needs. In its initial aRseasments of the
Second nvc Year Plan, the WOl'ld Bank experts concluded that the growth
tllrgcts were too ambitious :1nd recommended that consideration he given to
.1dju!ol tlllents that wou] d be necessary to scale down from 3 7 per cent to a 5
p~r cent growth t"rget. The Bank also advised the team OLl transpol·tation
Illanlling that it provided to '<orca in 1966 to assume a 6 per cent overall
gro",th r"t.:.' in JlL'~ptlrillg its es timate~ of transportation needs.
In time ~~ Korea's a~tual growth continued to average ncar 10 per cent
1.\ 196t> .trld 1967, the World Bank has apparently raised its sights and acceped
---'--_._---------------
.:~ ntis :HSt..':';SIRt.·at is reported in the Arthur D. Little draft rep0A:'t Eco::lomlc
[lcn:lop'l1l.·lll Pla~\flillg in Kore.l, May 1962, p. IV-I.
:~IJ 'I 1 ;.1 1 t' • h' • 1 liE • PI i i K ". K'.. '.lr cs,.,o .Jr. In 1$ :lrtlc e coooml.C ann ng n orea. In orea=t
,Hfair .... \'l'1. IIT. No.2, July 1964, urged that "US policies a:td prog-rams should
:.trollgly SUI),10CC the KO~C.l!:1 Plan and subsequent plans." (p. 237)
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7 ,U!r l:l'/Il 11'1 1Il'/lr t1a' Iuwl'r ratlwr lhan upper cnd of the f(!ll:.,ihlc growth rn~gc,
wLth ttl(' uppc'r 1 J.mLt rUllning up to 10-11 per cent. It ha!! also been more in-
cUrled to .1cccpt the Korean estimates of the investment and external resource
requirements to attai:l these higher rates of growth.
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Industrial Structure
confronting planners
The main choices/in the area of industrial structure involve the division
bctwe~n agriculture and manufacturing,andwithm manufacturin~ the relative em-
phas~s on light and heavy industry. The latter choice also is related to the
split between labor--intensive and capital-intensive production, the degree
of integration of the industrial structure vs. international specialization,
and thus the questions of international trade patterns. There have been a
number of shifts in the thinking and planning of Korean policy makers since
the Korean War which have been reflected in the plan targp.ts and strategies
re!~ting to industrial structure.
The Nathan Program emphasized the expansion of primary production--agri-
culture, fisheries and mining--to satisfy domestic demand aad meet the minimum
necessary export levels. They projected extensive import substitution to meet
coneumption and investment demand and to bring the import level down to roughly
10 per cent of GNP by the end of the Plan period. This move toward a more
closed economy was deemed necessary because of the apparently limited prospects
for boosting the export ratio above 10 per cent and also because of the objective
set for the Nathan Program of the economy being self-supporting by' the terminal
year, 1958. Thus the Program involved a somewhat forced turning inward towards
self-sufficiency as the only apparent means of achieving trade balance. These
trade and production projections p~oved very wrong, in part because they were
not accepted by the Korean Government, which therefore did not implement the
policies that might have contributed toward their realization, but also
because the projections wer~ probably unrealistic to start with.
One of the critical assumptions of the Nathan program was that rice
production could be raised ~uickly and that, by substituting other g~ains
=
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for rice, there could be a large surplus of rice available for export. This
sort of incrcas(> in rice production and exports did not occur. Instead Korea
haa continued to be a sizeahle importer of grains into the 1960's and has only
been able to export limited amounts of rice in years following exceptionally
good harvestfl.
The other major hope for exports was minerals which it was assumed would
amountto nearly $70 million by 1958 or on~-fourth of total exports. Minerals
did prove to he the main export, but they were only valued at about $10 million
in 19~8 which was nearly two-thirds of total exports of $16.5 million. Even
in the recent years when "cxports have expanded r.apidly, the level of mineral
exports haH not cxceedcd $25 million. While the failure of total exports to
expand during the 1950's along the lines suggested in the Nathan Plan should be
attributed mainly to the unwillingness of the Korean Government to implement
exchange rate and other policies which would have encouraged exports, it also
seems clear, on the basis of the subsequent experience with exports during
the 1960's that Korea's comparative advantage is mainly in the area of light
manufactured goods, not the agricultural and mining areas which the Nathan
Plan suggested.
Thc proposals for broad import substitution in manufacturing also failed
to materialize and this was probably fortunate for the long run growth of the
economy. The import substitution that did occur was largely at the final
processing stages, which resulted in continued dependence on imports of raw
materials and intermediatc goods. Large raw material. imports were inevitable
given Korea's limited natural resources, but the choice between imports or
domcstic production of intermediate goods was one of comparative cost. Many
intermediat(' gonds hav(! significant economies of scale so that to produce them
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only
in the limited quantities required ~o satisfy/the internal demands of the Korean
market would have been very inefficient. The costs of such inefficiency would
have fallen on the Korean consumer and would have been a high price to pay
for achieving i3elC-Rupporl:. The availability of substantial foreign aid
beyond the per·i.od originally contemplated in the Nathan Plan made it possible
to continue imports of intermediate as well as capital goods (imports of
I
finished con8UnJC'r goods dropped practically to zero) and reduced premature
investment in capital-intensive intermediate goods industries,
The Three Y(~ar Plan followed many of the same lines as the Nathan Plan
in 'thC' arras of i.ndustrial and trade structure, but it called for "progress
toward" rather than "achievement of" a balance of foreign trade. The export
tnrgp,ts were less ambitiou9 and the recognition of need for a continuing import
surplus, including imports of grains to meet the food defecit, was very dif-
ferent from the earlier program. Dut, like the Nathan Plan, the new plan cal-
led for major import subscitution in k~y industries such as chemicals, metals,
machinery and nitrogen~us fertilizer, and projected an absolute decline in
the import levt'l of 8 per cent between 19~j8 and 1962 despite a planned 22.6
per cent incrcas(~ in real GNP. Th~H proposed pattern of investment reflected
the korean objections to ex::::essive growth of consumption goods industries, and
. the desire to build an integrated or balanced industrial structure which was
generally conceived of as an increasing share of capital goods in total manu-
facturing production,30
With the First r'ive Year Plan the emphasis began to shift away from a
Sl.'lf-suCfh' h·nt, ~lt· im"ard-looking, industrial structure. Although there was
30
The l'hrC'~ \"t'ar PJan stated: "It is hoped we can change the ratio between the
production t,f capit.tI goods anel consumer goods from 25 :75 in the base year (1958)
to 35 :65 in the target year (1962),"
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still concern about raising the relative output of capital goods, there was
also a growing acceptance of the need for relatively high levels of imports
and of the idea that the trade gap would have to be closed mainly by raising
t:le mc:pol·t ratio. Ali stated in the Plan:
"TIle ultimate course of the Korean economy lies in
induslrialization. During the plan period, the period
of preparation for industrialization, emphasis will be
placed on development of power, coal, and other energy
~ourccs. increase in the earnings of farm households
by raising agricultural productivity, expansion of key
industrial facilities and adequate provision of social
overhead capital, utilization of idle resources, some
improvement in the balance of international payments,
primarily through increased exports, and technological
advancement. "31
Wolf, who was one of the advocates of this so-called lIunbal~nced growth strategy,"
has interpreted it as implying concentration on three key sectors: electric
32power, agriculture and social overhead capital. The expansion in these
areas was to provide a basis of essential inputs for growth of industrial
production which would he carried out mainly by the private sector.
'rh~ :Investment programs in (>lectric power and related expansion of coal
mJning were well ·designed and effectively implemented so that the country had
sufficient fillppli cs of electricity and coal by 1964 for the first time since
33the end of World War J t •
31stlnunary of tIll' First Five-Year Economic Plan, 1962-1966, Republic of Korea,
J2Chades ~.Jolf, "Econom i c Planning in Korea," pp. 230-31.
33S\lhsl'qllent ly, til(! vl'ry high growth of the economy and rapidly expanding industrial
ucmanuN r('slIlLcd ill rC'ncwed power and fuel shortages in 1966 and 1967, but these
cannot he cilnr~('d Il~aillst the judgements . ,f the First Plan. It was instead a
n.·fL,'CI iOI1 of S]OWIIL'SS r'O rt!sponu to changing conditions and needs during the
First Plan Period.
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Also thr. plans for ('xpansion of agricultural production were reasonable and
effective. 1bc targets (or increased cultivated and irrigated area, applica-
tion of fertiliz('r and pesticides were approximately met and the effects on
agricultural output were of the magnitude that had been predicted.
Whlln th(>t'(' w:ts proviSion in the First Five Year Plan for a number of
import 8ubAtltut~-typc industrial investments, these were less important than
in thl> prevJ nus plans. As a consequence the ratio of imports to GNP was
projected :is bci.n~ ahout 20 per cent in the terminal year which was approximately
the level in the baSe year. Also a rise in the import ratio was called for
during the Plan period to cover needed investment goods. Clearly this implied
moving toward a morc open, trade-oriented economy. Even s'o, the import pro-
jections proved conscrvl\tive. Actual imports over the whole Plan period were
about 7 per cent above th(' Plan levelS, but in the final year they were 4S
pE'r cent higher than the Plan.
'rhe' export projections seemed quite unrealistic at the time the First Plan was
i5RU'~d, and it is doubt flll that the planners hud much of an idea as to how the
targets might be achieved. nut the implementation of a se~ies of export incen-
tive measures beginning ill ll)6l and continuing over the next several years re-
sulted in such spectacular growth of exports that by 1966 the realized export
level of $250 million was nearly double the target level ot $137.5 million.
'fhl' cl')mposit ion of expoX'ts predicted in the Plan followed the traditional
assumptions that a~ricl1ltural and mineral products would predominate, but
this ton prov~u vl~ry inac~uratc as manufactures accounted for over 60
'H>r c('nt 0: tIll" total by 1CJ66.
Thm~ ,..hi h· tlw First Five Year Plan had anticipated at least the direction
Ill' 5,1111" or Lfl<' dlang,·s in i.ndustrial and trade structurc, it clearly underestimated
th,' ,,··:tl'nt llr f !tIlS,' l'IlilngN; anu it did not contemplatc many of the policies that
,.,'l"(' slIhs"'l\\l'lIlly \Is"ll to bring thCSl~ changes about.
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As thr. prl~paration of the Second Five Year Plan was getting underway,
th€' favorllb lp resultH or thcse new policies were bcc~ing apparent and as a
conSNltumcp the qtWR tJ onN thl.lt had to be answered in connection with industrial
structure {or the S~cond Plan were lTIJl"e in terms of how far the existing trends
would or should be pursued, and what marginal adjustments seemed appropriate,
rather than what major shifts in direction or policy were needed. One set of
proposals argued for continued expansion of exports and of agricultural pro-
duction, but with increasing reliance on a rural-oriented industrial sector
to supply the export commodities. This was intended to provide stronger
linkag~s between the urban and rural populations and improve the incomes of
-~ th~ rural inhabitants so that they ,could buy more of the rapidly growing
]Iindustrial production. The basic strategy of export-led industri~l develop-
mcnt was gcnerally accepted, but the rural industry emphasis was not, in part
out of concern that decentralized, small-scale producing facilities might be
leSs efficient and thar~forc impair the competitiveness of Korean exports in
world markets. Although there was a willingness to give at least equal, if
not some prefrrenli.al trcatmaut to smaller scale industry, there was a reluctance
to try to push such industry out into the rural areas as Fei and Ranis proposed.
Furthcrmon!, there W:18 a disposition to continue the agricultural programs of
the First Plan, which seemed to be paying off. While recognizing that the output
of the agricultural sector would grow less rapidly than that of manufacturing,
• it was ,,~xpccted that farm lncomc would continue to rise at a satisfactory rate,
that tilt' shl (t of populat ion from rural to urban areas was inevitable, and that
rapid I'Xp:tIlR ton of employment opportunities must occur in the cities.
TIll' main quc'stions conc(!C'ning industrial structure for the Second Plan
!('rl' (a) IlllW rapid Ly could eXF.)rts be increased; (b) whether the growth of
d..'m'lIl,,1 fm- l'('rl,ij n i lit l·r"'t·t1l.:Jt~! goods would be sufficient to justify building efficient-sU'ed tiants
n. r• (:. II. ','pi ,lncl l:lIstav 1{<lUh, "Toward t.l I.ong-Run Development Strategy for Korea,"
Oct. l, IIJ(,4, (Olianl.'o.) J p. :;1).
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within Korea; and (c) whether to permit large-scale importation of machinery
and equipment to support a rapid expansion of investment, or to try to divert
some of this demand to the domestic machinery and capital goods industries.
The expurt alter1l3tives were posed as a choice between target levels for
commodity ~xports in 1971 of $500 million or $700 million. These implied
comp~lnd 3nnual growth rates of 19 and 26 per cent from the 1965
level or $17~ million. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry and others
advocating high growth and rapid industrialization supported the high target.
Those who were more concerned about fin3ncial stability and a balanced industrial
32
structur~ argued for the lower target. The target finally chosen for the Plan
was $550 million, or a growth rate of 21 per cent. But this figure was hardly
agreed IIpon when current developments began to indicate that it was too conserva-
tive. As shown in Table 2 , current account earnings were well above planned
levels f n 1l)66 311<1 1')67, due mainly. to the service earnings, but this led to
increase's in tht' export tnrg<!ts for 1971 to $750 million for conanodities and
$lJ07'j million for goods and sl'rvices. Thus there has been a continuing process
of ra~8ing export targets and increasing the support for export activities as
the current export results h3ve exceeded earlier expectations. The strategy
decisions involved in the formulation of the Second Plan were just one stage in
thiH process.
At thl' time the Second Pl3n was being prepared there were two major invest-
ml'nt projl'cts under ~onsideration for which it was recognized that economics
of Sl'H!., w,'rt' important and thC'l'cforc that the prospective rates of growth of
lIl'llli.lIlll I,'l't''' Vl'ry significant. These '''ere an integrated steel mill and a petro-
clll'mlt:al l~,'ml,h':·:. ~",t: only was the overall growth rat.e of the economy of relevance
OJ :l.
. -Wor itl flank (';':J1l'rts its lale as the summer of 1966 were still suggesting that
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Table 2
Actual and Planned Levels of
Exports and Imports
(millions of US Dollars)
1965
Actual
1965-71
1966
Planned Actual
1967
Planned Actual
1968
Orig. Revis.
Plan Plan
1971
Orig. Rl~vis.
Plan Plan
Exports
Goods and scrvic~s
Merchandise only
290
175
395
250
455
250
462
300
643
320
524
360
787
450
719
550
1075
750
lmpoL"ts
Goods and services
Merchandise only
488
420
676
587
778
680
767
655
1,064
909
834 1,156
705 993
962 1,371
804
SourC('8: Actuals for 1965 and 11)66 arc from the BOK Monthly Statistical Review.
Actuals for 1967 oro from estimates prepared by the Asia ~partment of
t:lw tURD, dat~d April 11, 1968. Planned estimates for 1966 and 1967
and the Original Plan estimates for 1968 and 1911 are from The Second
"'f.v«.'-Y('ar Jkonomic Development Plan, 1967-71, pp. 202-3. The Revised
Plan estimates for 1968 and for 1971 are from the Overall Resources
Hudget: 1968, Economic Planning Board, Aug. 1967.
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but the growth and composition of exports and the decision on imported vs. domestic
capit~l Roods was likely to have a bearing on the appropriQte scale of the steel
and p~trochemical projects. One further consideration was that. if these pro-
J('cts were Lo supply the export industries. they should be able to do so at
world market prices. Because there was a predisposition against subsidizing
these products, it was hoped that costs of production could be brought down
to world market levels.
The decisions incorporated in the Second Plan on these two big industrial
projects were r(lacllt'd after an analysis of the overall growth of industrial
demand and the investments required in the lighter industry sectors to sustain
that ~rowth. Tt was then concluded that the petrochemical complex should be
undertaken in till' Posrly part of the Plan period both because it required less
total investment and because sufficient demand for its output seemed likely.
"he steel mill would be built in the latter part of the Second Plan and would
only come into production in th~ Third Plan period. This kind of confrontation
of demand prospects, overall investment availabilities and the investment needs
of other sectors was an essential feature of the decision making on industrial
. structure in th~ Second Plan and was made possible by the multisectoral frame-
work within which the PVln was formulated. The framework both required and
provided a hasis for the reconciliation of conflicting demands in order to arrive
at 4 feasible overall program.
The third criticul decision on whether to protect the machinery industries
was dominated hy tlw dcsi.re to maintain high rates of growth and investment and to
take.' Ildvanta~(! of the potential foreign capital which would be available mainly for
financing the importation of machinery and equipment. Therefore. despite statements
at various points in the Second Plan about the importance of building up the machinery
'32 (Gon I t) a $400 million target for 1971 was more reasonable.
--
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sectors, the investment tentatively earmarked for them was not very large and
much of that was likely to go into electric and mechanical appliances for the
export and consumer markets rather than into the heavier machine tool industries.
In sum, the Second Plan decisions on industrial structure were dominated
by the desire for high rates of growth and increased efficiency. By capital-
izing on the rapid growth of exports, which emanated mainly from the less
capital-intensive manufacturing industries, by delaying some of the more
capital-intensive projects until adequate demand for their output was assured, and
by r(~lying hravily on imported machinery, the Plan was intended to keep the
economy movin,:; ahead strongly. Growth was in fact so rapid in 1966 and 1967
that what had previously seemed to be ample capacity in the infrastructure
areas of power and transportation proved to be seriously deficient. Early
revisions of the Second Plan involved major acceleration and expansion of
investment in these two seetol'S so that they would "not become more serious
33bottlenecks to growth."
13 .l~conomlC l'lannin,:; Board, Overall Resources Budget: ~. August 1967, p. 13.
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Domestic Savings and Foreign Assistance
The prospects for increasing domestic savings and reducing dependence on
. foreiJ;n assistance have been among the most controversial issues of Korean
I planninJ;. Throughout the post-wa)." period the level of domestic savings in
relation to C:NP has been low by comparison either eith other countries or
with Korea's investment needs and targets. As a corallary, the level of
foretRn assistance has been high. While most Koreans have expressed a desire
to redress this balance and the foreign assistance provid~rs have supported
this idea, there has been continuing disagreement on the speed with which the
ahif t shou ld be hrough t about. There have als 0 been df.fferences as to whether
the shift would be achieved mainly by pushing for higher domestic savings rates
or accepting low~r rates of growth. The conflict is illustrated by a comparison
of the macro-economic projections of the Nathan Plan and the First and Second
Five-Year Plans. (See Table 3.)
1'le Nathan Plan projected very high growth of GNP in the early years of
the Plan but then declining sharply in the later years. The First Five-Year
Plan hud the reverst> pattern, starting with very low growth in the early
y(>arH nnd tlwn accelerating thereafter. The Second Five Year Plan assumed
steady 7 pC'r Cf'nt ~rowth throughout. These three patterns are symptomatic of
lIw IlrC'vaili.ng conditi.ons at the times the plans were fomulated. The Nathan
Plan was a r(!coIUHrllction program directed toward rebuilding the economy and
achieving St If-support. The First Five-Year Plan was designed to promote recovery
from S lllgllal jon. wlwrcas tht~ Secoll d Plan was intended to continue a high rate of
~r,')wlh (hut lind alr<"'.l<ly hel'n attained.
All (hret' of ttwSt! plans postulated a very sudden increase in investment
at the iJ('ginnjl1~ of the Plan. The Nathan Program was most extreme in that it
provided for an increase in investment equal to 72 per cent of the growth of
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C:NP whlll' (:Nl) WAH 1l119UIQC'd to ~row at 15 per c~nt. Thus the proposed investment
incr.pasl' C'xcr.r.dpd LO l)(>r cent of GNP, a very unrealistic target given the
condttf.uns in thf' country at that time. The investment increase projected in
the early years of the First Five-Year Plan was also large relative to the
change In GNP, hut because that latter change was relatively small the invest-
ment target was less ambitious. The Second Plan assumed a more modest initial
increase in investment and a fairly steQdy marginal increment thereafter, whereas
the earKcr plans contained sharply declining marginal increments. Here again
the Nathan Plan was extreme in that it assumed investment in the final year
would deci!ne absolutely by an amount equal to the rise in GNP.
Th~ domestic savings projections of the first two~lans were similar in
that they assumC'd very hiE;h marginal savings rates during the first half of
the Plans and then a sharp tapering off in the last two years. In the Second
Plan the marginal savings rate was less high on average and was expected to
increase significantly in the first year and then decline absolutely at least
after the second year. Again in the Nathan Plan it was to drop precipitously
in the final year.
A Simple comparison of the three Plans shows that the ,earlier expectations
of dramatic change have become more cautious and conditioned by reality with
ttl(' passag(' of time. 'rhe kinds of adjustments called for in the Nathan Plan
were ('xlrt'mc', :lnd some similar ones were repeated in the First Five Year Plan.
ny tltl' SCl:"IHI 1'1."111 thcrC' was greater awareness of comparative experience in
uther' (,'Cl\lntr-lc'~ ;u; well as in Korea. The limits of change in marginal savings
IIl1d f nVI'stml'nt rilt('s were! better appreciated, but also the structural relation-
ships ill till' I\,'rt':ln ('conomy were less seriously out of balance than at the
b('J;illllin~ uf thl' (·arlier 1'lans. There was also a recognition that Korea
should CXpt>ct to have a sizeable net capital inflow for the foreseeable future,
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Table 3
Changes in Investment. Domestic Savings
and Foreign Capital Inflow 8S Ratios of
GhallfjC8 in GNP! as Projected in Three Plans
Rase y(.!ar Year 1 2 to 3 to 4 to
to year 1 to year 2
....L ...!L.. _5_
Nathan Plan (1954 to
1958·9)
Investment .72 .12 -.16 -.23 -1.00
Domestic Saving .45 .42 .46 .16 .20
Foreign Capital Inflow .27 -.29 -.62 -.39 -1.20
Per Annum (;rowth of GNP 15% 10'%. 9% 5'1. 5%
First Five-Year Plan
(1962-1966)
Investmt>nt 1. 38 .68 .39 .14 .16
Domes tic Saving .89 .64 .52 .33 "25
Foreign Capital Inflow .48 .04 -.13 -.19 -.09
Per Annum Growth of GNP 27.. 6% 7% 8% 8%
Second Five-Year Plan
(1967-1971)
[nve8tment .54 .27 .27 .28 .23
Domestic Saving .27 .25 .34 .35 .33
Foreign Capital Inflow .26 .02 -.07 -.07 -.09
Per Annum Growth of GNP 7"10 7% 7~ n. 7%
Usse y~nrs were for the Nathan Plan, 1953-54; for the First Five-Year Plan, 1960;
•
for the S..conc1 ~'iV('-Yl'al' Plan, 1965.
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hilt that the sourcC'f:l of fi.nancing for the inflow would shift from mainly grant
34
aid to publlc Rnd private loans and equity investment. For these several
reasons the Second Plan projected smoother and more reasonable adjustment in
the Rtructllrl! of domestic and foreign savings than had the earlier plans.
The extreme assumptions about the potential increases in savings and
forciRn capital during the early years of the Plans provided the basis for
planning comparable expansion of investment. By attempting to carry out these
investment programs, d~spite the failure of domesti~ savings to grow as expected.
the potential for severe inflation was created. It is therefore not surprising
that prices rose rapidly during the first years of both the Nathan and First
3S
.'he-Year Plans. 'fh(! clearest example of. this is found in the 1962-3 period
whpn Investment WIHI (!xpnnded suhstant:=.ally but still not as rapidly as planned.
Forr1~n capital inflow also rose. but savings did not respond at anything like
the contemplated rate. As a consequence inflationary forces were unleashed.
Domestic credit was doubled in two years to finance a large budgetary deficit
(despite the highest ratio of taxes to GNP in Korea's post-war experience),
and foreign exchange reserves were severely drawn down. This experience led
to the imposition of strong stabilization measures and postponement of planned
)/1
:-hw l'eggy IS. Musgrave. "Trade Targets and Policies in Korea's Economic Devel-
opmunt," Aug. 22, 1965. (mimeo), p. 15.
'3 'j
Althous;:h til(' N:llh.:tn Plan was never accepted by the Korean Government, it did
hlJ\,(' SllIlU' ill" LIlt.'lIef' n n policies and program9. Thus it is not unreasonable
til Sll):r.l·~ I thnt ,11(' i.nvl'stment projects of the Korean Government and supported
hy "ll' .lid a~(,llciNi wcre cClcricd forward on the assumption that something
.'1pproximat i ng lilt' S.1v i.ngs rates projected in the t~athan Plan would be fOJ:thcoming.
',-
Table 4
Comparison of Planned and Actual Changes in Investment. Domestic
Savings and Foreign Capital Inflow in Relation to Changes in GNP
during the First Five-Year Plan
1960-62 1962-3 1963-4 1964-5 1965-6
Planned
Investment 1.38 .68 .39 .14 .16
Domes tic Saving .89 .64 .52 .33 .25
Foreign Capital Inflow .48 .04 -.13 -.19 -.09
Per Annum Growth of GNP 2% 6% 7% 8% 8%
Actual
Investment .35 1.02 -.40 .07 .82
DQmestic SavioR .20 .50 .45 .16 .45
Foreign Capital Inflow .15 .52 -.85 -.09 .37
Per Annum Growth of GNP 4% 9% 8% 1% 13%
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investment in 1964-65. Thus the unrealistic projections of d~stic savings,
36
noted by Wolf and others, contributed to financial tnstabll!ty and disruption
of plan implementation.
Public VB. Private Decision-Making
AR with other clements of development strategy, there hllve been some
R1Rnificant shifts in positions on the degree of government ownership of
productive facilities or control over economic decision-making in Korea.
These attitudes have not reflected a deep philosophical or political division
flO milch as changing circumstances within the country and changing conceptions
of what would he most conducive to achieving the more fundsmental economic
and political ob.lectives. Korean exposure to the Japanese pattern of close
relations and coordination between government and private business has probably
predisposed the Koreans to accept that as a no~l pattern.
At the end of World War II, Japanese property, including much agricultural
land and most of the industrial facilities in the country, was taken over by
the us military government and then transferred to the Korean Government after
1948. The aRrictlltural land was distributed to private owners as part of the
~eneral land reform program in 1949 and 1950, but what was left of the industrial
fnc:fliti.ctl at the end of the Korean War was still mainly in Government hands. Although
the ~overnmcnt had lndicated its intention to transfer these properties to private
ownership, much difficulty was experienced in setting prices and arriving at
silt-is [llct()ry agr<.'(~mcnts under the wartime and illlllediate post-war conditions.
The Nathan Plan cam(! out strongly in favor of encouraging the growth of
llll~ privdt"(' 5('clllr ano selling the government-owned enterprises, other than those
ih
CharlN' Wolf, .Jr. "J~conomic Planning in Korea," p. 235, and Nam Duck Woo,
"~:"rea' s r.~p(·r il'nC(~ with Planning," in Lee Sang-eun, Ed., Report of Intcrnationat
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constitutionally required to be ret£~ned by government, to private businessmen.
It also urged that the government sharply curtail the numerous direct controls
over production, trade and prices which had been introduced during the Korean
I
War and which were severe restrai11ts on private decision-making and enterprise.
the Korean Government did go ahead with the sale of many industrial plants
and financial institutions but there were subsequent charges of corruption and
claims that the facilities had been made available on preferential te~8 to
ijroups closely associated with the Government. (After the military coup in 1961,
many of these properties were repossessed and the private owners fined or
imprisoned.) The IUu.'e Government retained ownership of all public utilities
and most hssi.c enterprises. It also maintained many of the direct controls
over prices, Imports, investment activity and credit allocations so that even
though there was some increase in private ownership there was little progress
toward greater private decision-making.
The Three-Year Plan, completed near the end of the Rhee regime, claimed
that the ideal of the plan was "to foster the free market system and the
37
creative activities of private enterprises." Considering the pattern of
policies and actions of the Government at the time, this ideal may have been
included as a sop to the foreign aid donors rather than an expression of
serious intent.
36 (Con't)
Gonf<"n~llcc on the Problems of Modernization in Asia, (Seoul, Asiatic
Rcst.!srch Center. 1966) pp. 520-23.
37university of Oregon, Report, p. 22.
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Th. short-lived Democratic Party Government, which followed the student
revolution in 1960, did move in the direction of reducing controls and greater
reliance on market forces. The exchange rate was sharply deva:.. I.d in early
1961, and import and price controls were relaxed. 'The draft plan that was pre-
pared by this government indicated a continuing movement in the direction of
more liberal policies although the share of government investment in the total
38investment program was relatively large.
Under the Military Government and the Supreme Council of National Recon-
struction, the emphasis shifted back to the direction of greater government
control and operation of the economy. As stated in the First Five-Year Plan,
the economy was to be operated under a system of 'guided capitalism in ~hich
the principle of free enterprise and respect for the freedom and initiative
of private enterprise will be observed, but in which the government will either
directly participate in or indirectly render guidance to the basic industries
39
and other important fields." These guidelines were followed during at least
the first three years of the Plan period. Government took over a number of
enterprises from private owners who were judged to have profited illegally
under the earlier government. New government corporations were established
to buJld and operate such basic industries 88 oil refining and distribution, and
fertilizer production. The cOtll11ercia1 banking system was largely controlled by
th\! Ministry of lo'inance. i\nd as inflation and overvaluation of the exchange
rate became st:>rlous t the Goverl1mel1t imposed the most perv••ive system of import
snd investment contruls b1at had existed in Korea.
Th~s(' lrt:>nds were reversed to a considerable degree after the elected
~overnm~nt took office and the Chung II Kwon cabinl~t was appointed with Chang
JH
Wolf, ~. £!l. p. 2l9.
')l)
Sllnullary (If lh(! 1,'irsL ~'iVI -Year Economic Plan. 1962-66, p. 28.
~.
Key Young as Deputy Prime Minister and chief economic policy maker. The devaluations
and semi-freeing of the exchange rates in 1964 and 1965 led to relaxation of im-
port controls. The interest rate reform of 1965 wal accompanied by greater
freedom of bank lending operations. And the policies for encouraging foreign
investment and expansion of domestic private investment included reduction of
Government involvement in the approval of such invesbaent. Clearly the Govern-
ment did not withdraw from these areas completely. Fo),:mal government approval
was still required for most types of foreign trade and domestic investment, and
the government retained ownership of many enterprises. But the degree of
Covernment interference in private decision-making had been reduced.
By the time the Second Plan was prepared, these new dlrectiuns were so
well established and seemingly effective that the Plan could state that "by
faithfully adhering to the principles of a competitive market economy.
and by exploiting the advantages that accrue from such an economy, the overall
40
objective of an 'efficient and active national economy can be achieved." The
Plan went on to say that "in the formulation of economic policies, • • • a high
priority will be placed on those policies which will minimize direct goverlwental
41
control. II As regards the process of investment allocation the Plan indicated
that C;ov('rnment would assume a guidance function by disseminating information
on the types of industries which would be facing heavy demands for capacity
('xpans f.on over the coming years ~ 2Although the Government has continued to review
and approve investment proposals, especially those requiring foreign financing, the
criteria for approval have been increasingly dominated by economic factors and
the proc~ss has I)(~come more efficient, or at least the volume of approvals has
greatly {ncrcased.
40
The S('c,md Five:' Year Economic Development Plan B67-71, ,22. ill., p. 33.
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e The fm),act of Plannl.ng
After nearly a decade and a half of planning activity in Korea what can
be said about its impact on the effectiveness of government operations and on
relations between the government and the people. Beyond this can anything be
concluded on the contribution of planning to the overall growth and efficiency
of the economy'!
The early planning efforts, including the Nathan Plan, the Three Year Plan
of 1959 and the first version of the Five Year PI~n, did little to raise the
government's effectiveness. The Nathan Plan's main significance was that it
introduced the concept of overall planning to Korea, but because the Korean
government had not participated in the planning process and did not accept the
Plan as a guide for policies or investment, the concept remained quite abstract
and irrelevant for government operations. If anything, the government leaders
during this period (1953 to 1958) rejected the idea of overall planning and
were not interested in .trying to define longer-run economic objectives or an
integrated set or policies. This probably reflected a belief on their part
that Lhey could relain more flexibility and achieve better results in negotia-
t Ions with aid donors by proceed.tng on an ad hoc basis and avoiding the overall
conml.tmcntR and constraints of a plan. Clearly the Nathan Plan called for very
forceful policy action by the Korc~n government and set ambitious targets of
self-support which the Koreans were not prepared to accept. To have agreed
to the Plan would have exposed the govermnent to serious political risks.
n.."spi te the Government's rejection of the Nathan Plan, there was still
somt> t"'ndency to judge the country's economic performance against the standards
uf Lh<.' I'hn and to attri.bute the failures manifested in continuing inflation,
rls In~~ trade dcfic its and declining growth rates to the absence of an overall
-44-
plan. rt WIIS as a result of these views that the Korean government established
the lkonomic Il~veh'pment GOllncil under the Minister of Reconstruction and initiated
its uwn pJannln~ ('£forts in 1958. But, this too proved to be mainly an educational
~xpcrf('nc(' and not effective in influencing Government operations.
'l'he group rt'9ponsihle for formulating the three-year plan was too isolated
from either thc operational or policy-making levels of government to draw upon
the experience or guidance of either level in trying to articulate a meaningful
development program. Also the Korean planners had no experience and practically
no outside assistanc~ in their work. They borrowed an unsuited macro framework
from abroad and tri.ed to fit it to the Korean scene. Finally the overthrow of
the Gov·Z!rnment shortly after the Plan was drafted meant there was never an oppor-
tunity to test its possible influence on the Government. Still some gvvernment
officials had at least been exposed to the ideas and problems of planning and
had gafnl'd some experience in those areas.
ConScftll(!Otly, the formulation of the first and second versions of the First
Five Year PJan,undcr governments that openly espoused the importance of planning,
showed somewhat more sophistication and the prospects for greater influence on
government programs. The main reasons why these prospects were not fully
realized was that the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction imposed
what seemed to be a very unrealistic framework of targets on the planners and
the resulting pilln WitS severely criticized by both foreign and domestic analysts.
This immedilltely cut the p,round out from under the planners and reduced their
influence in the guvcrnment. The very poor performance of the economy during
the fi rs t y~a r of the Plan, the subsequent inflation, and the time-consuming
hilt fruit less t! Horts of the planners to scale down the Plan to satisfy the
('ritics cOmpl(!ll'1y removed the planners from the main stream of decision making.
'I'll(' First Plal1 as sllch was hardly referred to until work was started on the
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Second Plan and also until it became apparent that a number of the seemingly
too ambitious First Plan targets were going to be exceeded.
Somc aspccts of the investment program of the First Five Year Plan were
inflllentLal and (:ontributed to the subsequent growth of the economy. The
cmphasis on agri.culture and infrastructure helped to remove serious bottlenecks
and activate lagging sectors of the economy. These were also the areas in
which government had primary responsibility (as in power and railroad transport)
or was ahlc to carry out more effective programs than the private sector had
been ahlc to do (e. g. fertilizer distribution). Other more questionable areas
of emphasis wcre either ignored, as with the steel mill, or postponed until
the economy was bctter prcpared to implement them (e. g. the fertilizer plants).
nlUS tlw investment program of the Plan served only as a rough guide and invest-
ment decision,; continucd to be made on a case by case basis, often without the
planners having much say in the final decision.
Although the nrs t f'ive Year Plan did not have a well-worked-out set of
economic policies, it did imply a number of policy directions that were subse-
qucntly followed and provided the real impetus for Korea's rapid growth. These
lnc:llldr.d the encouragement of exports, and domestic savings, and maintenance
of rcalistic, markct-oriented interest and exchange rates. While it is difficult
1.:0 ass(!ss thC' importance of these policy suggestions in the Plan in bringing about
(hp actnal hnpl f.!mfmtati all of the policies, and it would undoubtedly be misleading
l,' atll'f.hlll:t' ,j si~nificant role, it can at least be said that the tendencies
expressed til (Itt' Plan were nol contrary to the policy directions followed mainly
afl'er 196/~. '1'11(' Plan was not cited as a basis for recoamending the new policy
dir('ctions nor did thc planning technicians have much role in formulating the
flOll(:!tlS a1th(lu~h lhe Ucmlty Prime Minister (and concurrently Minister of the
Ikunomic Planni 1lJ.; B~,ard) was the principal official responsible for implementing
'Ill' po Iides. lit' tc..'lld~ld Lo draw directly on the staff work from various parts
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of the government rather than relying heavily on the planning staff.
By the time work began on the Second Plan in 1965, planning as such was
,definitely not a well established or influential process in the Korean Govern-
ment. '111e Ff rs t Plan had been discredited, its revision ignored and the planning
Rlaff WAH not significantly involved in the current major economic policy delib-
t·r:ltJuns. It I:'J therefore remarkable that within little more than a year the
plonn in~ fllnd 1.(111 and the p lanllt~rs became integral parts of the government's
dpcisJnn-making proc~ss. Thfs can be attributed to the following factors: the
quality of the stntistical and analytical work that went into the prepar~tion of
planning modf~ls ,1nd proJections; the leadership of the Vice Minister of the
I';(~onomit; Plannf.ng J\oard in organizing the planning effort, and the active par-
ticipation of many officials from all parts of the government; the support and
involvemr.nt of the foreign aid agencies, including the World Bank, in plan
formulation rather than simply sitting in judgement on the completed plan; and
finally the r(·all.?ation that .the Plan was likely to have some continuing influence
un tlw hud~ctllry I1ml policy actions of the government in the coming years. Becau~e
the various :lgc'ncles of til(' governmC'nt began to suspect that the planning might
hav(' such fnfltwnct.'. they took it more seriously and thereby contributed to its
incrrased significance.
In til(' policy areas, the Second Plan largely confirmed the policy directions
which wt're established while the Plan was being formulated. This included measures
ttl incrt-'ase public and private saving, limiting inflation, encouraging exports and
rredlH~ tip cunlt'uls on iml)Orts. As regards investment, the Second Plan began to
[.1C(' lip to tlw pOSSibilities and needs of high growth rates. But it did not
conRid('r or aC~~t'pt the possibility of very high growth (e.g. above 7 per cent
p(Or yf.'ar). pint Ir hccC1llse or the criticism of such high targets in the First
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Plan and also heclluse of continuing admonitions from the World Bank to hold
,
till' E(l"owth targ<·t of thr Second Plan to 6 per cent. As for the composition
nf 'nveRt"nlcnl tilt· pJ/lnning process led to some deferring of large, capital-inten-
S'.Vl· investment projects and some squeezing of the investment recommended for
transportation. Such cuts were understandably resisted by the ministries
conc<~rn(!d, but ht'causc representatives of those ministries had participated
rKt~n8ively in the Plan deliberations they were well aware of the overall resource
constraints.' Thus the total investment program of the Second Plan was accepted
hy the various parts of government without serious disagreement and became a
mcanlny-Cul. ~1I1d~ for the Government's capital budget ~nd decisions on approval
of forei~;n inv<,stments within Korea.
Thl' w(~akcst pRrt of the Second Plan was its program for agriculture, which
fRll(!{1 to dp.finr. a comprehensive ::let of targets, to relate investments and
pollcles lo those targets, or to indicate the other kinds of inputs required
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to expand agricultural output. Ct1l1srquently the agriculture program in the
Src(md 1'llln w.1~ largely tgnored and agricultural investment has subsequently
belm decided without reference to the Plan.
Although it became obvious dur.ing the first year of the Second Plan period
that the ov~rall growth targets of lhe Plan were too low and in particular that
the tnvestmunt pro~rammcd for the power and transportation sectors was grossly
i.nadt'qlutl:t', this did not l"esull' in discredi.ting the planners and the planning
Pl'OCNUI. Ir anything It strengthened the conviction that more and better plan-
ning was rwcdl'd, [II pat't: thi.s was because the limitations of predictive accuracy
had hel'o C It'llrly at'knowledged in the Second Plan and procedures reconmend~d for
n.·vitlin~ thC' il1v~st"'('llt program annually to take advantage of new information
llnd mt'('( dlllnginf~ (;onditlons. Also the sectors where shortages became acute
SUnt(·wh.ll" Iwt. tt'r aJ.~ri (:11 I tural sector planning had been done in the 7 year
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were lhosp. which would b(!ncfit most firom good medium term demand projections.
I~tnally In KUrl'll I t is prohahly easier to revise estimates of growth and
Lnvestnt<llll. up rathcr than down wtthout "loosing face," because it attests to
the conservatism or the planners.
On balanc~ it seems fair to conclude that the Second Plan achieved an impor-
tant influence on the Korean Government and that the annual overall resource
budgets have so far provided a focal point for review and revislon of policies,
Investment programs and projections of Korean economic growth. It remains to
he seen whether this pattern will continue and eventually flow into the form-
ulation or the Third Plan.
The Second Plan also for the first time had the effect of strengthening
.
the polillcal stature of the Government, both at home and abroad. Where the
Nathan Plan and the First Five Year Plan had resulted in major disagreements
with foreign aid donors and had exposed the Government to criticism and embar-
assment wl.thin Korea, the Second Plan elicited much more favorable reactions
and thereby generated greater recognition and cooperation for the Government.
The Nathan PIau with its overly demanding targets gave an unreasonable
scI: of s tand:lrds against whl ch actual performance was compared. Although the
Y.orean (;ovcrnml'ut was not committed to cdrrying out the Plan, it was still,
tu some' cxtcmt' Judged against the plan targets. Also in time the Government
was criticlzl'cJ for nut doing its own planning and trying to organize the recon-
struct ion ;wd development effort more effectively.
Thl' I,'irst 1·'Lve YC3r Plan, which was the culmination of three years work
t.o ",Cl't stich critic isms, was in turn criticized openly by academics and the
prCNR aN wt'll as the foreign appraisers. This tended to discredit the Government
(COIl'l') . •
"'ond Gram Production Plan completed in 1964, but this was not used
as 11ll' haSts h)r th<> agd.culture program in the Second Five Year Plan.
"
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in the eyes of the people and caused· doubt about its intentions and abilities.
Finally in the last two years of the First Five Year ptan, as economic achievements, ,
began to equal or exceed the targets· of the "unrea1istic'~,,Plan, the Government
h('gan to claim some crc-dit for the Plan and to suggest, ~~at the Plan and its
related polIcies had contributed to the achievements. While the public was
unahle to ('valuat.c' thr. degree of causation, or perhaps did not care, the sentiment
.~rew that lhe ",. rs t Plan had been reasonably successful and that the Government
deserved some credit for it. This helped to create a mor~ receptive environment
for the Second Plan.
When the Second Plan was made public in the summer of 1966, many of its
provisionR were already well known through advance publicity and press conferences
by the officf.als of the Economic Planning Board. Thus there were no surprises in
th(~ Plan; but it Inmcdiately attracted a great deal of attention and cOlIIDent in
r.h(.' pres~ and on tclevi.sion. T"~ ·overnment organized an effective program to
puhllcba.· the P}:\I1 aud to answer questions or ei:lticisms of it. The 'President
indicated his approval snd conmitment to carry out the Plan which the cabinet
had ('ndorsed to 1Iim. 1'hu8 the Government presented the Plan to the public with
a lin I ted front and sn air of confidence.
The' prfncipal reactions to the Plan by the initial· reviewers, both domestic
and for(.'l~n. was that it was honest and represented a relatively high degree of
comppt('llce. The admission in the Plan document of past errors of policy and
statistical misrepresentation, and the projection of growth rates below those
of the recent past were all taken as evidence of a new integrity in the Government.
While there were criticisms of various aspects of the Plan, most critics first
ackl1owl("d~c-d the 3pparent sincerity and conscientiousness of the planning effort.
1\ sample survey of the opinions of Korean professors and journalists conducted in
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lat.r~ l'JhfJ fOllnd t hilt HO per cent expected some succeas from the Second Five Year Plan.
" II :;lIllg Cit i t:k Ihmg, TIlt' Intl' 11 c-c tlla 1 and Moderni.zation - A StudY of Korean
.;,·.·,h .
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No'cCJIIParable survey was taken after the earlier plans were completed, but the
fact tbat such. large proportion of traditionally skeptical and anti-government
sraup. were favorably disposed toward. and relatively confident about the benefits
~o be derived from, the Second Plan was a noteworthy political achievement •
. :... There was even Rome tendency, in the glow of enthusiasm and confidence at the
tt.. the Plan was made public in mid 1966, to talk as though the targets of 1971
••8d already been achieved and the 1981 projections were nearly assurred. This
too vas remarkahle for a people who had been accustomed to a time horizon that
.eldom exceeded 12 months.
It was th~rc{ore not surprising that the President based his campaign
for reelectIon on the successful completion of the First Plan and the seeking
of a popular mandate to carry out the Second.
-/',
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Attitudes, (Seoul, Dachan Textbook Co., 1967).
